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Abstract. Prediction Error Minimization theory (PEM) is one of the most 
promising attempts to model perception in current science of mind, and it has 
recently been advocated by some prominent philosophers as Andy Clark and 
Jakob Hohwy. Briefly, PEM maintains that “the brain is an organ that on aver-
age and over time continually minimizes the error between the sensory input it 
predicts on the basis of its model of the world and the actual sensory input” 
(Hohwy 2014, p. 2). An interesting debate has arisen with regard to which is the 
more adequate epistemological interpretation of PEM. Indeed, Hohwy main-
tains that given that PEM supports an inferential view of perception and cogni-
tion, PEM has to be considered as conveying an internalist epistemological per-
spective. Contrary to this view, Clark maintains that it would be incorrect to in-
terpret in such a way the indirectness of the link between the world and our in-
ner model of it, and that PEM may well be combined with an externalist epis-
temological perspective. The aim of this paper is to assess those two opposite 
interpretations of PEM. Moreover, it will be suggested that Hohwy’s position 
may be considerably strengthened by adopting Carlo Cellucci’s view on 
knowledge (2013). 
Keywords: Prediction error minimization; Scientific realism; Analytic method; 
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1 Introduction 
Prediction Error Minimization theory (PEM) is one of the most promising attempts to 
model perception in current science of mind, and it has recently been advocated by 
some prominent philosophers as Andy Clark (2015; 2013a; 2013b) and Jakob Hohwy 
(2015; 2014; 2013). 
Briefly, PEM maintains that “the brain is an organ that on average and over time 
continually minimizes the error between the sensory input it predicts on the basis of 
its model of the world and the actual sensory input” (Hohwy 2014, p. 2). Top down 
predictions and bottom-up sensory signals combine to produce “a kind of internal 
model of the source of the signals: the world hidden behind the veil of perception” 
(Clark 2013b, p. 185). 
This approach moves along that line of research which looks at the brain as an ‘in-
ferential machine’, initiated by Hermann von Helmholtz (1867) and continued, among 
others, by Richard Gregory (1980), Irvin Rock (1983), and Chris Frith (2007). 
  
2 
 
An interesting debate has recently arisen with regard to which is the most adequate 
epistemological interpretation of PEM. The debate focused mainly on how the rela-
tion between the inner model of the world produced by the brain and the external 
world should be interpreted. 
Indeed, Hohwy (2014) maintains that given that PEM supports an inferential view 
of perception and cognition, PEM has to be considered as conveying an internalist 
epistemological perspective.
1
 Thus, if we accept that PEM is a reliable description of 
the mind, we should coherently draw the conclusion that we cannot reach knowledge 
of the way the world really is, i.e. the way it is independently of our mind, because of 
the indirectness of the relation between our inner model of the world and the modeled 
world. For example, Hohwy states that “perceptual content is the predictions of the 
currently best hypothesis about the world” (Hohwy 2013, p. 48). If this is the case, we 
cannot be sure that our best hypothesis truly corresponds to the world, because the 
brain cannot “simultaneously access both the internal estimates and the true states of 
affairs in the world” (Hohwy 2014, p. 4). The brain can only have access to the two 
homogeneous things that it can compare, namely the predicted and the actual input: 
“there is no possibility of independent evidence, which would require us to crawl 
outside of our own brains” (Ibidem, p. 7). Following this line of reasoning, since there 
is in principle no possibility of comparing our representation of the world to the world 
itself, it seems fair to conclude that PEM should be considered at odds with Scientific 
Realism (SR), the mainstream metaphysical view in philosophy of science according 
to which our best scientific theories are true and we can safely infer their truth from 
their empirical success (Psillos 1999).
2
 
Contrary to this view, Clark (2013a) maintains that it would be incorrect to inter-
pret in such a way the indirectness of the link between the world which is modeled 
and our inner model of the world, because the relation between the world and percep-
tion is indeed a direct causal relation. Thus, even if our representations of the world 
are internal and may be in some sense deemed indirect, the causal connection between 
the world and our brains which produces such representations guarantees that what is 
perceived is not just “the brain’s best hypothesis. Instead, what we perceive is the 
world” (Clark 2013a, p. 492). On Clark’s view, “biological beings are able to estab-
lish a truly tight mind-world linkage […] by individual learning and evolutionary 
                                                          
1 On the internalist and externalist conceptions of epistemic justification see Pappas 2014. 
2 It may be objected that the scientific realist view would be better described as follows: sup-
posing that empirical successful theories are true (or approximately true) provides the best 
explanation for their empirical success. But this ‘explanationist’ formulation of scientific real-
ism is almost equivalent to that given above. The fact is that scientific realists usually consider 
Inference to the Best Explanation a valid and truth-conducive inference. For example, Harman 
describes IBE as follows: “one infers, from the premise that a given hypothesis would provide a 
‘better’ explanation for the evidence than would any other hypothesis, to the conclusion that the 
given hypothesis is true” (Harman 1965, p. 89). So, if truth is the best explanation of success, 
and IBE leads to truth, an IBE may be performed to conclude that it is true that a successful 
theory is true. So, we can infer the truth of a theory from its success. Thus, those two formula-
tions of realism are almost equivalent. I wish to thank an anonymous reviewer for having raised 
this issue. 
  
3 
 
inheritance,” and the inferential functioning of perception does not introduce any sort 
of  “worrisome barrier between mind and world” (Clark 2013b, p. 199). Thus, accord-
ing to Clark’s interpretation, PEM should not be considered at odds with SR. 
The aim of this paper is to assess those two opposite interpretations of PEM. In or-
der to do this, PEM is sketched in section 2; then Hohwy’s and Clark’s interpretations 
of PEM are presented in section 3; in section 4 those interpretations are evaluated, and 
it is argued that Hohwy’s interpretation is more adequate to account for some of the 
salient epistemological features of PEM. In section 5, some of the difficulties which 
still afflict Hohwy’s position are underlined. Finally, in section 6, it is suggested that 
Hohwy’s position can be considerably strengthened by relating it to Carlo Cellucci’s 
view on knowledge and science (2013), which will be briefly described. 
2 Prediction Error Minimization Theory 
PEM is an ambitious theory, which tries to account for the activity of the brain in a 
unified way. Indeed, according to PEM “prediction error minimization is the only 
principle for the activity of the brain” (Hohwy 2014, p. 2). PEM basically sees the 
brain as an organ that continually minimizes the error between the predicted sensory 
input and the actual sensory input. This view frames the activity of the brain into a 
wider conception according to which any self-organizing system that is at equilibrium 
with its environment must minimize its tendency to disorder. In this perspective the 
characteristic feature of living beings is their attempt to (locally) reduce entropy 
(Friston 2010). According to this view “biological agents must actively resist a natural 
tendency to disorder,” and “agents are essentially inference machines that model their 
sensorium to make predictions, which action then fulfils” (Friston 2011, p. 89). 
Since “the sum of prediction error over time is also known as free-energy, PEM is 
also known as the free-energy principle” (Hohwy 2014, p. 2). According to Friston’s 
view, the free-energy principle says that “biological organisms on average and over 
time act to minimize free energy,” and that “brains are hypothesis-testing neural 
mechanisms, which sample the sensory input from the world to keep themselves with-
in expected states:” as “the heart pumps blood, the brain minimizes free energy” 
(Hohwy 2015, p. 2). Thus, according to PEM “the brain’s main job is to maintain the 
organism within a limited set of possible states” (Ibidem), and many, if not all, brain 
functions may be accounted for in terms of free-energy minimization. 
In other words, in order to maximize the chance of survival of an organism, the 
brain has to keep the organism in the range of states which are already known 
(through evolution, development, and learning) to be compatible with the existence of 
that organism. In order to do this the brain has to minimize ‘surprise’, which is a con-
cept from information theory, “defined as the negative log probability of a given state, 
such that the surprise of a state increases the more improbable it is to find the creature 
in that certain state” (Ibidem). 
The fact is that to accomplish its task, the brain cannot access directly the state of 
the world in which the organism is embedded. The brain has to create a model of the 
world, and try to anticipate and predict the incoming states of the world. The brain 
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“must harbor and finesse a model of itself in the environment, against which it can 
assess the surprise of its current sensory input,” because the brain has access only to 
two quantities, “which it can compare: on the one hand the predicted sensory input, 
and on the other the actual sensory input. If these match, then the model is a good 
one” (Ibidem, p. 3). At any stage of this process, the brain deals only with its own 
‘reconstruction’ of what is going on both in the world (exteroceptive states) and in the 
organism (interoceptive states). Indeed, even the actual sensory input arriving at the 
brain cannot be conceived as a direct transferring of a bit of information from the 
world to the brain. At any stage, there is an ‘inferential step’ through which the brain 
models the environment, the organism, and the course of actions. The brain makes 
hypotheses based on previous knowledge to form a coherent representation of present 
and future states, but it is also ready to modify or update such hypotheses on the base 
of the actual input. At any given time t we cannot have the certainty that our hypothe-
ses will not be modified at time t+1. 
It has to be stressed that PEM is a new way of accounting for perception, which 
contrasts the traditional “‘passive accumulation’ model of the perceptual process”, 
which “depict[s] perception as a cumulative process of ‘bottom-up’ feature detection” 
(Clark 2013a, p. 470-471). According to PEM the role of the predictions made by the 
brain is essential. It is exactly this feature of the brain functioning which accounts for 
the ability of the brain to relate to the world without having any direct access to it. 
The brain is seen as a hypotheses producer and verifier, a sort of ‘predictive device’ 
which continuously refines (or changes) its predictions. 
The idea of the brain as an ‘inference machine’ was firstly articulated by von 
Helmholtz (1867). PEM follows this line of reasoning and models brain activity in 
terms of statistical inferences over perceptual hypotheses. According to Hohwy, PEM 
is “inference to the best explanation, cast in […] Bayesian terms” (Hohwy 2014, p. 5).  
The basic idea is that since the brain continuously checks how good its model of the 
world is by confronting its model with the actual sensory input, its activity may be 
described in Bayesian terms. Indeed, in a nutshell, Bayes’ rule tells us to update the 
probability of a hypothesis h, given some evidence e, by considering the product of 
the likelihood, i.e. the probability of the evidence given the hypothesis P(e|h), and the 
prior probability of the hypothesis P(h). The resulting probability of the hypothesis is 
the posterior probability of such hypothesis:  
 P(h|e) = P(e|h)P(h)/P(e) (1) 
Thus, ‘minimize the surprise’ for the brain means to maximize the probability of its 
hypothesis: “if the prediction error is minimized then the likelihood has been maxim-
ized, because a better fit between the hypothesis and the evidence has been created. 
This in turn will increase the posterior probability, P(h|e), of the hypothesis” (Hohwy 
2013, p. 46). According to PEM, the probability of a hypothesis h is continuously 
updated and refined, using the posterior probability of h at time tn as the prior proba-
bility of h in the following inferential step, i.e. at time tn+1: a “neat explanatory circle 
then seems to transpire: top-down priors guide perceptual inference, and perceptual 
inference shapes the priors” (Ibidem). The brain tries “to create a closer fit between 
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the predictions [...] and the actual sensory input. This corresponds to being less sur-
prised by the evidence given through the senses” (Ibidem). 
We can now recapitulate the three main tenets of PEM: 1) in order to account for 
perception, we should adopt an inferential conception of the mind; 2) the division 
between inner and outer is strict (‘inferential seclusion’ of the mind, see Hohwy 
2014); 3) perception, attention, and action have to be conceived as statistical infer-
ences. 
3 Clark’s vs. Hohwy’s Interpretation of PEM 
PEM is a stimulating and controversial proposal. There are many objections that can 
be (and have been) raised against this approach.
3
 In what follows we will leave aside 
those objections. We will focus just on Clark’s and Hohwy’s interpretations of PEM, 
and on the issue of assessing which one should be preferred in the lights of the epis-
temological implications of adopting PEM as a theory of the mind. 
3.1 The Epistemological Implications of PEM 
In order to carry out our inquiry, we will take into considerations (and try to answer) 
two questions, the first one which can be dubbed ‘metaphysical’, the second one 
which can be dubbed ‘epistemological’. The first question is: Is PEM compatible with 
SR? The second question is: Which epistemological position fits better PEM? 
For our purposes, we can here define SR as the metaphysical view according to 
which our best scientific theories are true, in the sense that they tell us precisely what 
exists in the world. For example, Ellis states that SR can be described as “a two-stage 
argument from the empirical success of science, to the truth, or approximate truth, of 
its dominant theories, to the reality of the things and processes that these theories 
appear to describe” (Ellis 2005, p. 372). Truth is normally intended by scientific real-
ists as correspondence.
4
 For example, Sankey states that: “correspondence theories 
which treat truth as a relation between language and reality are the only theories of 
truth compatible with realism” (Sankey 2008, p. 17). With regard to epistemology, we 
can here intend it in the broad sense of the philosophical inquiry on what makes some 
of our beliefs knowledge, i.e. justified, or true, or grounded. 
3.2 Hohwy’s Interpretation of PEM 
According to Hohwy, PEM entails an internalist epistemological perspective. 
Internalism may be intended here in a broad sense as the epistemological view ac-
cording to which what ultimately justifies any belief is some mental state of the epis-
                                                          
3 Cf. e.g. Rescorla 2015. 
4 Many positions have been elaborated on the issue of truth, and even if truth as correspond-
ence seems to be the most widespread view among scientific realists, not every scientific realist 
adopts such view. For simplicity here we will focus on correspondence. 
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temic agent holding that belief (Pappas 2014).
5
 Since according to PEM the totality of 
the brain activity can be accounted for in terms of Bayesian inferences, and since in 
this line of reasoning knowledge cannot but be conceived as related to the brain activ-
ity, the inferential nature of such activity is related to the way in which our knowledge 
can be considered justified. In other words, since the brain has no direct access to the 
world, and knowledge is produced by the brain, knowledge cannot but be ultimately 
justified by the brain’s activity itself. According to PEM “the brain is isolated behind 
the veil of sensory input” (Hohwy 2013, p. 238), and the human mind “appears very 
indirectly related to the world” (Ibidem, p. 90). Indeed, “mental states do not extend 
into the environment, and the involvement of the body and of action in cognition can 
be described in wholly neuronal, internal, inferential terms” (Hohwy 2014, p. 24). 
Briefly, Hohwy’s argument runs as follows: we have to adopt an inferential con-
ception of the mind, because otherwise we are not able to account for some very well 
known phenomena (e.g. binocular rivalry, see Hohwy 2013, chap. 1). If we adopt an 
inferential conception of the mind, we cannot avoid to adopt an internalist epistemo-
logical perspective, since we cannot eliminate the separateness that characterizes an 
inferential conception of the mind. Thus, we have to accept that we are in principle 
not able to avoid some radical skeptical challenge, such as Cartesian skepticism. This 
is the epistemological price to pay if we want to adopt PEM as a theory of the mind. 
Indeed, “PEM must necessarily rely on internal representations of hidden causes in 
the world (including the body itself) in order to predict the sensory input that they 
give rise to” (Hohwy 2014, p. 17). 
As we have already seen, at any given time t we cannot have the certainty that our 
hypotheses will not be modified at time t+1. Moreover, it has to be stressed that even 
if the predicted hypothesis and the actual sensory input match, and even if this match-
ing remains stable for a certain amount of time, this does not guarantee us that our 
hypothesis truly corresponds to the state of the world, and so that such hypothesis is 
true in a strong metaphysical sense. Indeed it could be possible that our sensory sys-
tem and our internal model of the world both fail to detect and model some features of 
the world or some modifications of some detected features. Think to a modification 
that cannot be detected, because its magnitude is below the detectability threshold of 
our sensory system. In this case, the sensory input and the model would continue to 
match, while that modification would have nevertheless occurred. The fact is that in 
order to modify our hypothesis, we need to have some ‘clues’ that such hypothesis is 
incorrect. But it is not always easy to have an indication of the inadequacy of some of 
                                                          
5 It may be objected that internalism is better described as the idea that justification requires 
awareness of the process that ultimately justifies a belief. But, in this context, such definition of 
internalism is equivalent to that given above. Indeed, according to PEM, what we can be really 
aware of are ultimately nothing but some mental states. So, even if the process that justifies a 
belief is an ‘external’ one, we will not be directly aware of such process. We will only be aware 
of the internal model of such process. So, if internalism is the view according to which justifi-
cation requires awareness, and according to PEM we can be aware only of some mental states, 
then in this context internalism may be fairly defined as the view according to which a belief is 
justified by some mental state of the epistemic agent holding that belief. I wish to thank an 
anonymous reviewer for having raised this issue. 
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our hypothesis or recognize to which hypothesis a specific clue refers to. Indeed, per-
ception solves “an underdetermination problem. The perceptual system estimates 
environmental conditions,” and it “does so based upon proximal stimulations of sen-
sory organs,” but the proximal stimulations “underdetermine their environmental 
causes” (Rescorla 2015, p. 694). Thus, since the environmental causes are underde-
termined, also the clues of inadequacy of our hypotheses, which are a subset of the 
environmental causes, are underdetermined. 
The inferential nature of the mind, which makes us constantly prone to error and 
deception, but which, at the same time, ensures us the only possible way to effectively 
acting in the world, “should make us resist conceptions” according to which “the 
mind is in some fundamental way open or porous to the world” (Hohwy 2014, p. 1). If 
the mind were open to the world, the predictive machinery described by PEM would 
not be necessary. Indeed, PEM puts “the focus on the evidentiary boundary and the 
way it forces a clear distinction between internal states, where the prediction error 
minimization occurs, and hidden causes on the other side of the boundary, which must 
be inferred” (Ibidem, p. 7). 
Moreover, PEM treats the inferential machinery of the mind in Bayesian terms. 
This means that the inferences that PEM deals with are statistical in character. But 
“any account that ties perceptual content to a statistical model within an evidentiary 
boundary will wedge apart the statistical model and the hidden causes it models” 
(Ibidem, p. 9). On this point Hohwy is very clear and states that: 
 
having access to rain samples and the mean of the rainfall is a very different thing from 
having access to the actual rainfall, even if the mean carries information about the rain. 
An explanation of this difference in the case of perceptual inference cannot soften the 
characterization of the hidden causes so they come to appear somehow unhidden.6 
 
Thus, according to Hohwy, the three main tenets of PEM are deeply related: the 
“seclusion stems from the inferential component such that the upshot of the sub-
personal processes is a probabilistically favoured statistical model” (Ibidem), and they 
jointly entail an internalist epistemological perspective. 
This seems to mean that according to Hohwy’s interpretation PEM is not compati-
ble with SR. If scientific realists claim that the aim of science is truth, and usually 
adopt a non-epistemic conception of truth, according to which whether something is 
true does not depend on our mind, but depends exclusively on the way the world is,
7
 
this means that PEM cannot satisfy such a realist requirement. Indeed, according to 
PEM what we perceive or think cannot but ultimately rest on and be justified by our 
brain activity, and we cannot have any access to the way the world is independent 
from such kind of activity. As Hohwy states, we cannot “crawl outside of our own 
brains” (Ibidem, p. 7) in order to compare our model of the world to the world itself. 
                                                          
6 Hohwy 2014, p. 9. 
7 Cf. e.g. Sankey 2008, p. 112: “The realist conception of truth is a non-epistemic conception 
of truth, which enforces a sharp divide between truth and rational justification.” 
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Thus, if we adopt PEM, we will never be able to assess whether a statement is true 
because it exactly corresponds to the way the world is independently from us. This is 
due to the fact that our mind works inferentially and the only things it can compare 
are homogeneous neuronal inputs. So, even if the realist conception of truth were the 
right one, if we adopt PEM we will be unable to judge whether we reached the truth, 
since we will be unable to claim that something is completely independent from our 
mind. But this contrasts with the fact that the great majority of the scientific realists 
refutes epistemic skepticism: realists claim that we do reach true theories and we do 
know that we have reached the truth. For example, Sankey states that the realist posi-
tion is “a position of epistemic optimism, which holds against the sceptic that humans 
are able to acquire knowledge of the world” (Sankey 2008, 3). Since knowledge is 
usually intended by realists as related to the concept of truth,
8
 it becomes clear that in 
this line of reasoning if we adopt PEM, we are unable to claim to have genuine 
knowledge. Since, on the contrary, PEM’s supporters, and Hohwy among them, claim 
that we do have knowledge exactly through prediction error minimization, we have to 
conclude that PEM and SR are not compatible, at least because they rest on a different 
conception of knowledge.
9
 
3.3 Clark’s Interpretation of PEM 
According to Clark’s interpretation of PEM, it would be incorrect to interpret in the 
way suggested by Hohwy the indirectness of the link between the world which is 
modeled and our inner model of the world. 
Indeed, Clark admits that following PEM our representations of the world have to 
be described as internal and may be in some sense deemed ‘indirect’: PEM “is a chal-
lenging vision, as it suggests that our expectations are in some important sense the 
primary source of all the contents of our perceptions” (Clark 2013b, p. 199). Nonethe-
less, Clark maintains that “we may still reject the bald claim that ‘what we perceive is 
the brain’s best hypothesis’,” since “it remains correct to say that what we perceive is 
not some internal representation or hypothesis but (precisely) the world” (Ibidem). 
We can affirm that we perceive ‘precisely the world’ because of “the brain’s ability 
to latch on to how the world is” (Ibidem). If the brains were not able to adequately 
‘reflect’ how the world really is, we would had not been able to survive. But we sur-
vived, so we can affirm that our representations are reliable. Indeed, “it is precisely by 
such means that biological beings are able to establish a truly tight mind-world link-
age. Brains” can be construed as “statistical sponges structured [...] by individual 
                                                          
8 Cf. e.g. Ibidem, p. 14, fn. 2: “the traditional justified true belief account of knowledge is a 
minimal condition for a realist conception of knowledge.” 
9 It may be objected that if someone does not rely on the notion of truth, she is not speaking of 
knowledge properly, since knowledge requires truth. Thus, it would be nonsense to speak of 
knowledge without referring to truth. But that knowledge necessarily requires truth is exactly 
what has been disputed by some of those authors who are unsatisfied with the traditional ac-
counts of knowledge (see below, sec. 6). Thus, if in their conception of knowledge does not 
figure any reference to the concept of truth, it seems unfair to conclude that they are not really 
speaking of ‘knowledge’, for the only reason that we assume that knowledge requires truth. 
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learning and evolutionary inheritance so as to reflect and register relevant aspects of 
the causal structure of the world itself” (Ibidem). The idea behind such view is that in 
order to survive the organisms have to produce true representations of the world, i.e. 
representations that ‘correspond’ to the way the world really is. Thus, it is the causal 
connection between the world and our brains that produces our internal representa-
tions of the world and it is our success in the survival that guarantees that those repre-
sentations are adequate, i.e. that what is perceived is not just the brain’s best hypothe-
sis, but the actual world. 
Clark seems to explicitly commit himself to the traditional correspondence view of 
truth. For example, he agrees with Karl Friston that the “hierarchical structure of the 
real world literally comes to be ‘reflected’ by the hierarchical architectures trying to 
minimize prediction error” (Friston 2002, p. 237, quoted in Clark 2013a, p. 492). 
PEM “delivers a genuine form [...] of ‘openness to the world’,” and thus might “be 
cast as a representationalist version of ‘direct perception’” (Clark 2013a, p. 492). 
According to Clark, even if PEM adopts an inferential conception of the mind that 
makes our perception not as direct as the supporters of the direct perception view 
maintain,
10
 nevertheless the close causal relation that obtains between the world and 
the brain, and the evolutionary and developmental selective processes that shape our 
priors, consent us to define our perception at least as ‘not-indirect’. Clark states that: 
“If a label is required, it has been suggested” that the metaphysical perspective im-
plied by PEM “may most safely be dubbed ‘not-indirect perception’” (Ibidem, p. 
493). In this perspective the indirectness of the inferential nature of our mind is tem-
pered by the ‘directness’ of the externalist justification of our hypotheses somehow 
measured in terms of success in dealing with the world. 
Let’s recapitulate the elements of Clark’s interpretation of PEM analysed so far 
which suggest that Clark’s view is very close to SR. Clark seems to adopt a corre-
spondence view of truth, which is one of the most widely adopted conception of truth 
among scientific realists (see above, sec. 3.1). He also claims that we perceive the 
world as it really is and not just a hypothesis regarding the world. So he seems to 
subscribe to a non-epistemic view of truth, which is the view of truth usually adopted 
by scientific realists (see above, sec. 3.2). Moreover, Clark seems to justify his claim 
that we perceive the world as it really is in a way which is analogous to the way in 
which scientific realists justify their claim that our best theories are true, i.e. develop-
ing a ‘success argument’. Since our hypotheses about the world are successful in 
making us surviving, the only plausible explanation for their success is that they are 
true, i.e. that they are able to reflect how the world really is. This kind of argument is 
clearly a variant of the ‘No Miracle Argument’, the argument traditionally used by the 
realists to support SR, according to which the only plausible explanation for the suc-
cess of our best scientific theories is that they are true (see e.g. Psillos 1999). 
It is worth noticing that in clarifying his view on PEM, Clark explicitly refers to 
Michael Rescorla’s interpretation of the Bayesian approaches to the mind, which 
include PEM (2015). Rescorla’s interpretation of the Bayesian approaches to the mind 
                                                          
10 On the direct view of perception see Soldati 2012. See also Pappas 2014. 
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is straightforward realist. Rescorla explicitly claims to support a scientific realist per-
spective and advocates that success is a key element in epistemic justification: 
 
I assume a broadly scientific realist perspective: explanatory success is a prima facie 
guide to truth. From a scientific realist perspective, the explanatory success of Bayesian 
perceptual psychology provides prima facie reason to attribute representational content to 
perceptual states.11 
 
According to Rescorla the Bayesian approaches describe the way in which we es-
timate the world, and to do this they assume, more or less implicitly, a realist and 
externalist epistemological point of view, i.e. an epistemological view according to 
which what ultimately justifies any belief is something other than some mental state: 
 
Accuracy of the percept depends upon accuracy of the individual estimates. By describ-
ing perceptual inference in this way, we type-identify perceptual states truth-
conditionally. We individuate perceptual states partly through environmental conditions 
that must obtain for the states to be accurate.12 
 
So Clark’s interpretation seems to be committed to externalism. Externalism is 
considered to be the more adequate epistemological position to take in order to sup-
port a realist perspective, since it claims that a belief, which is ‘internal’, is justified 
by some ‘external’ element, which is independent from the subject. 
For all these reasons, it seems fair to say that according to Clark’s interpretation 
PEM should not be considered at odds with SR. Indeed, according to Clark, PEM 
gives us knowledge of the way the world really is, i.e. PEM gives us an account of 
our mind as able to produce true representations of world. Since the majority of the 
scientific realists adopts a conception of knowledge as justified true belief, or some 
variant of it, and Clark’s interpretation of PEM claims that we do have knowledge and 
that knowledge is related to the truth, in this perspective PEM is compatible with SR. 
4 Assessing Clark’s and Hohwy’s Interpretations of PEM 
In order to assess Clark’s and Hohwy’s interpretations of PEM we will proceed as 
follows: we will derive some of the most relevant epistemological consequences from 
the three main tenets of PEM (sec. 4.1). It is important to stress that both Clark and 
Hohwy mostly agree on such tenets, so it seems fair to start from them. Then we will 
try to determine which epistemological position is more compatible with PEM (sec. 
4.2). Finally, we will try to show whether such epistemological position fits better 
Clark’s or Hohwy’s interpretation of PEM (sec. 4.3). 
                                                          
11 Rescorla 2015, p. 705. 
12 Ibidem, p. 702. 
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4.1 The Epistemological Implications of the Three Main Tenets of PEM 
In what follows it will be argued that if we take into account all the three tenets of 
PEM described above (sec. 2), the more adequate epistemological position for PEM’s 
supporters to take is infinitism. Let’s see why. Take the first tenet: ‘PEM adopts an 
inferential conception of the mind’. It is especially this inferential characterization of 
the mind that should lead PEM’s supporters to prefer infinitism in epistemology. 
This point can be clarified in two ways: by underlining the similarities between the 
challenges that both an inferential conception of the mind and infinitism have to face 
(we will take this way in this section); and by showing the incompatibility between 
what is implied by the three main tenets of PEM and what is implied by the other 
main epistemological positions (we will take this way in the next section). 
With regard to the similarities between an inferential conception of the mind and 
infinitism, the most striking one is that they have both to face a similar skeptical re-
gress problem. Indeed, as the skeptics deny that is possible to account for knowledge 
without ending in a regress, so “it seems we cannot explain perceptual inference at all, 
without ending in circularity or regress” (Hohwy 2013, p. 42). The problem is how to 
justify the claim that our perception is reliable, i.e. that we perform the correct infer-
ences. As Hohwy states, if perception is an inferential process: 
 
either the inferential process is constrained or not. If it is not constrained, then there is no 
robust difference between right and wrong inference, and inference [...] remains unex-
plained. If it is constrained then the source of the constraints either is already engaged in 
correct perceptual inference or it isn’t. If it is so engaged, then positing the source of the 
constraints as the explanation of perceptual inference [...] is circular or leads to a regress. 
If it is not so engaged, then again there is no difference between right and wrong infer-
ence.13 
 
As in epistemology the main issue is how to connect justification to truth in order 
to secure knowledge from the skeptical challenge, so for an inferential conception of 
the mind the main issue is justify the claim that perception is reliable in representing 
the world even if the mind has no direct access to the world. 
The problem is that according to the inferential conception of the mind, the mind 
can only make inferences in order to represent the world hidden behind ‘the veil of 
perception’: the mind cannot go out from what can be called the ‘inferential circle’. 
Thus, according to this view of the mind, our relation to the world is not only possible 
but actual, but the relation between our representation of the world and the world 
itself can only be thought in terms of a potentially infinite process, since we can never 
‘crawl outside of our own brains’ and compare our representation and the world in 
order to definitely state that a relation of correspondence obtains. This makes clear the 
similarity between such a view of the mind and infinitism. Indeed, infinitism denies 
the skeptical claim that we cannot have knowledge because we cannot justify our 
knowledge. According to infinitism knowledge is not only possible but actual, but the 
                                                          
13 Hohwy 2013, p. 42. 
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justification of our beliefs has to be thought as a potentially infinite process, since we 
cannot go through the complete chains of reasons that justify our beliefs. 
Thus, since PEM adopts an inferential conception of the mind, and such a concep-
tion of the mind represents cognition as a potentially unterminated inferential process, 
if a supporter of PEM tries to determine which epistemological conception fits better 
her favourite account of the mind, she would probably adopt infinitism. 
4.2 Which Epistemological Position is more Compatible with PEM? 
To better see the point made in the previous section, let’s now turn to the second way 
of making clear why an inferential conception of the mind leads to infinitism. In order 
to show the difficulties of making compatible what is implied by the three main tenets 
of PEM and what is implied by the other main epistemological positions, we have to 
briefly consider the main alternatives to infinitism that are on the market. 
Indeed, it has to be noticed here that both Clark and Hohwy seem to maintain a 
traditional attitude toward knowledge and justification, in the very minimal sense that 
they both refute skepticism, and thus have to defend the claims that we do have 
knowledge, and that knowledge is somehow related to the truth. 
In a nutshell, skepticism claims that if we try to justify our beliefs we cannot but 
end in circularity, petitio principii, or infinite regress.
14
 According to the skeptics, in 
any of those three cases we are unable to justify our beliefs. Since in all those three 
cases our beliefs would be unjustified, and being justified is a minimum (even if in-
sufficient) requisite for a belief to be genuine knowledge, we should conclude that we 
cannot have knowledge. 
On the contrary, those who refute skepticism maintain that knowledge is possible. 
In order to advocate for this position, epistemologists have negated that one or anoth-
er of the above reported cases really prevent us to reach genuine knowledge, as skep-
tics maintain. Thus, traditionally the non-skeptical epistemological options are: 
coherentism, according to which circular patterns of justifications can enable 
knowledge; finitism, according to which finite patterns of justifications can enable 
knowledge; infinitism, according to which infinite patterns of justifications can enable 
knowledge (Turri and Klein 2014). 
Let’s briefly analyse them in order to see which one fits better the three main tenets 
of PEM. Consider coherentism first. The main problem with coherentism is that if we 
want to defend the claim that we have genuine knowledge and we consider 
knowledge as related to the truth, coherentism seems to be too permissive. As Klein 
and Warfield state: “coherence, per se, is not truth conducive” (Klein and Warfield 
1994, p. 129). The fact is that not only true sets of propositions may be coherent. For 
example, Cellucci states that “the propositions of a fable form a systematically coher-
ent whole, though being a fiction” (Cellucci 2014, p. 525). Moreover, if we allow 
repeating chains of reasons
15
 in order to justify a given belief, we do not really en-
                                                          
14 See e.g. Floridi 1993. 
15 We refer here for simplicity to ‘reasons’ even if not every epistemological view requires 
‘reasons’ in order to consider a belief to be justified. See Turri and Klein 2014. 
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hance the justification of that belief, because that very belief would figure in its own 
justification. Finally, consider coherentism in relation to the first main tenet of PEM, 
i.e. the inferential nature of the mind. The problem is that the coherence among our 
inferences would not suffice to assess whether they give us genuine knowledge, since 
those inferences may be internally coherent, but nevertheless be unreliable in repre-
senting the external world, which is the main issue at stake in this context
16
. 
Thus, it seems fair enough to say that if we adopt PEM we are left with two main 
epistemological options, i.e. finitism and infinitism. In order to determine which one 
fits better PEM, take now into consideration the second main tenet of PEM, i.e. the 
division between inner and outer is strict (seclusion). Consider finitism, i.e. the posi-
tion according to which finite patterns of reasons can enable knowledge. To see the 
difficulty of combining finitism and PEM, recall that if we adopt PEM we subscribe 
to an inferential conception of the mind and that according to PEM the mind cannot 
have any direct access to the world. Since finitism implies that we should arrive at 
some basic knowledge which does not require justification at its turn, the question 
arises: How can the inferential circle be ‘stopped’? In other words, how could we 
justify the claim that we have reached the end of an inferential chain where our repre-
sentation of the world truly corresponds to the world, given the inferential functioning 
of our mind and that our mind cannot directly access the world? 
Consider this issue in Bayesian terms. Since PEM models our mind as a ‘Bayesian 
machine’, in this framework the finitist’s claim that we arrive at some basic 
knowledge which does not require to be justified at its turn would amount to know the 
exact distribution of probability of any possible case without the need of making any 
new hypothesis in that model. But, as Hohwy clearly states, the brain: 
 
cannot assess surprise directly from the sensory input because that would require know-
ing the relevant probability distribution as such. To do this it would need to, impossibly, 
average over an infinite number of copies of itself in all sorts of possible states in order to 
figure how much of a surprise a given sensory input might be.17 
 
Thus, in order to claim to possess some basic knowledge, we should be able to ac-
tually go through an infinite inferential performance and assign the exact probability 
to any possible state of the world. Let’s put aside, for the sake of the argument, the 
philosophical difficulty of making sense of the claim that we can know the exact dis-
                                                          
16 It may be objected that this is an unfair description of coherentism, since many coherentists 
usually require in their theories some additional constraint on coherence to account for the 
truth-conduciveness of coherence. But, as Olsson has clearly underlined, “these theories may be 
more fruitfully classified as versions of weak foundationalism than as pure coherence theories. 
An advocate of weak foundationalism typically holds that while coherence is incapable of 
justifying beliefs from scratch, it can provide justification for beliefs that already have some 
initial [...] degree of warrant” (Olsson 2014, Sect. 1). This means that for our purposes, weak 
foundationalism, as well as foundationalism, can be fairly considered a kind of finitism, since it 
has to be based on some kind of beliefs that have some basic form of justification, which can-
not be accounted for in terms of coherence. 
17 Hohwy 2015, p. 3. 
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tribution of probability of all the possible states of the world. The main problem is 
that finitism has in common with skepticism the idea that it is impossible to actually 
perform infinite mental operations, given that humans are limited beings. It is exactly 
for this reason, i.e. to avoid infinite regress, that finitism claims that knowledge to be 
possible must rest on some basic knowledge. But if it is impossible for us to perform 
infinite operations, then in a Bayesian perspective we are not able to reach the basic 
knowledge required by finitism to claim to have genuine knowledge. Thus, we should 
conclude that we do not have knowledge. But PEM’s supporters normally claim that 
we do have knowledge. So there is a clear tension between finitism and PEM. 
Let’s now consider the last main tenet of PEM: perceptual inferences have to be 
conceived as statistical inferences. PEM models perceptual inferences using the 
‘Bayesian decision theory’ framework, which models decision-making under uncer-
tainty. This choice is due to the fact that according to PEM it is impossible to know 
the exact distribution of probability of all the possible states of the world. If it were 
possible to know such exact distribution of probability, there would be no need to 
continuously update our hypotheses about those states. Rescorla states that: 
 
The core notion underlying Bayesian decision theory is subjective probability. Subjective 
probabilities reflect psychological facets of the individual or her subsystems, rather than 
‘objective’ features of reality. To formalize probabilities, we introduce a hypothesis 
space H containing various hypotheses h [...]. A probability function p maps each hy-
pothesis h to a real number p(h), reflecting the agent’s subjective probabilities.18 
 
This should make clear the divergence between PEM and finitism. When we model 
perception in Bayesian terms, we construe the hypothesis space’s elements as percep-
tual estimates. The goal of PEM “is to describe a statistical inference over estimates 
about the perceiver’s environment” (Rescorla 2015, p. 712). It is not easy to see how 
it could be defended the claim that some ‘estimates’ are such that they do not need 
any further justification, and so may be considered as basic knowledge.
19
 
4.2.1 A Naturalist Option for Finitism 
Let’s briefly consider a ‘naturalist’ proposal which could be made in order to make 
finitism, PEM and SR compatible. It could be argued that, since priors are given by 
natural selection, the inferential circle is ‘broken’. The world instills in us the correct 
priors, which are not inferential at their turn and are justified by the world itself, and 
this fact ends the regress. 
The problem is that this externalist proposal, which is in line with Clark’s ap-
proach, just begs the question on what justifies our beliefs. Indeed natural selection 
deals only with fitness, i.e. survival, and not directly with truth. If we try to connect 
                                                          
18 Rescorla 2015, p. 696. 
19 Cf. e.g. Hohwy 2014, pp. 2-5: “just as there is a schism between a statistical model and the 
modeled cause in statistical inference, there is a schism between the prediction-generating 
models of the brain and the modeled states of affairs in the world.” 
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survival and truth we should adopt a sort of reliabilism and maintain an argument that 
could be roughly described as follows: since some beliefs have proved to be success-
ful, they have been selected; selected beliefs are then reliable; reliability is a guide to 
the truth; natural selection gives us true beliefs. This is a very debated and controver-
sial issue.
20
 But reliabilism seems nevertheless to be inadequate to secure a realist 
finitist perspective mainly for two reasons: 1) reliabilism does not completely fill the 
gap between justification and truth; 2) reliabilism seems to many authors insufficient 
to account for human knowledge. 
With regard to 1), it will suffice to recall the words of a realist champion as Psillos: 
 
In my (1999) [...] I argued that NMA proceeds within a broad naturalistic framework in 
which the charge of circularity loses its bite because what is sought is not justification of 
inferential methods [...] but their explanation and defence (in the epistemological exter-
nalist sense) [...]. I now think, however, that [...] [what] we should be after are reasons to 
believe that IBE is reliable (and not just an assertion to the effect that if indeed IBE is re-
liable, and we are externalists about justification, we are home and dry).21  
 
With regard to 2), here it will suffice to recall the words of Ernest Sosa: 
 
Admittedly, there is a sense in which even a supermarket door ‘knows’ when someone 
approaches [...]. Human knowledge is on a higher plane of sophistication [...]. Pure 
reliabilism is questionable as an adequate epistemology for such knowledge.22 
 
From what we just sketched above, it clearly appears that reliabilism in combina-
tion with finitism is at least not an easy option to take for PEM’s supporters. 
4.2.2 PEM and Infinitism 
We discarded coherentism because repeating chains of reasons are objectionably 
question-begging, and finitism because finite chains of reasons are objectionably arbi-
trary at their terminus. Thus the only available epistemological option for PEM’s 
supporters is infinitism. Since we have also shown some important convergences 
between PEM and infinitism, we can conclude that infinitism is the epistemological 
position that fits better PEM. 
                                                          
20 See e.g. Vlerick and Broadbent 2015. 
21 Psillos 2011, p. 26. Cf. also Klein 2015, Sect. 1: “reliabilist or externalist responses to philo-
sophical skepticism constitute a change of subject. A belief could be reliably produced [...] 
but the reasons available for it could fail to satisfy the standards agreed upon by both the 
skeptics and their opponents.” 
22 Sosa 1983, pp. 58-59. 
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4.3 Comparing Clark’s and Hohwy’s Interpretations of PEM 
So far we have tried to answer the two questions raised in section 3.1, i.e. whether 
PEM is compatible with SR, and which epistemological position fits better PEM. We 
can sum up our inquiry as follows: Clark’s interpretation of PEM involves an exter-
nalist perspective and is sympathetic to SR, while Hohwy’s interpretation involves an 
internalist perspective and is less compatible with SR. As we have seen, this also 
means that Clark’s view is more suited for a finitist epistemological perspective, 
while Hohwy’s view seems more suited for an infinitist epistemological perspective. 
Indeed, it seems not easy to conciliate the realist claims that we do reach the truth and 
that truth is correspondence with the infinitist perspective on justification. Moreover, 
we have underlined how infinitists are dissatisfied with an externalist and reliabilist 
view of epistemic justification, which is exactly the position that characterizes Clark’s 
interpretation of PEM. Then, since we have shown that to account for all the tree main 
tenets of PEM an infinitist perspective is the more adequate, Hohwy’s interpretation 
of PEM seems to be preferred. 
5 On Some Difficulties Still Afflicting Hohwy’s Position 
In this section we will sketch some of the difficulties still afflicting Hohwy’s position: 
1) how to model the formation of the hypotheses; 2) the difficulties deriving from 
infinitism. 
With regard to 1), Hohwy says almost nothing on how to model the hypothesis 
formation process. We intend to refer here to the production of those hypotheses that 
are not ‘innate’. Hohwy just takes for granted that hypotheses are produced and then 
updated. This is a crucial issue for all the Bayesian approaches to the mind, since 
Bayesian formalism does not account for knowledge ampliation, it is intended just to 
model the refinement of the probabilities of given hypotheses. 
With regard to 2), first of all there is the question of how knowledge has to be con-
ceived if we adopt PEM. Since Hohwy gives no peculiar account of knowledge, we 
may presume that he intends knowledge in the traditional sense, i.e. as related to the 
concept of truth. But we have seen that PEM conveys a view of the mind that may 
well be considered as taking an ‘antirealist stance’, given that we have judged it to be 
at odds with SR.
23
 The problem is that there is a tension between the claim that we do 
have knowledge and that knowledge is related to the concept of truth, and an antireal-
ist stance. Thus, if we adopt PEM the traditional conception of knowledge seems at 
least to be wanting. Secondly, there are the difficulties deriving from adopting 
                                                          
23 Hohwy’s view can be described as a sort of ‘Kantian scientific antirealism’, which particu-
larly resembles Bas van Fraassen’s scientific antirealism, especially on the issue of ‘representa-
tion’ (see van Fraassen 2008). Indeed, Hohwy’s view of the relation between the internal model 
and the sensory input is similar to van Fraassen’s view of the relation between theoretical mod-
els and data models. We can at most compare them and make them fit, but this does not guaran-
tee us that they reflect the world itself, since we cannot directly confront our models and the 
world. 
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infinitism. Indeed, even if infinitism seems to be the best option when compared to 
coherentism and finitism, it nevertheless presents several problems. We will sketch 
just two of the main problems that arise in combining PEM and infinitism. First, if 
PEM’s supporter adopts infinitism, then she has to address the main problem afflict-
ing infinitism, i.e. that of giving some feature which is able to discriminate among 
chains of reasons without regress. Indeed, infinitism claims that infinite chains of 
reasons may justify our beliefs. But allowing infinite chains of reasons is insufficient. 
The problem is how to discriminate those infinite chains of reasons that justify a giv-
en belief from those infinite chains of reasons that do not justify that belief: 
 
The regress condition itself cannot explain the connection between justification and truth, 
but any additional feature that could explain this connection would undermine the ra-
tionale for the regress condition itself [...]. So infinitism must distinguish infinite se-
quences of propositions that are justification-affording – those upon which actual justi-
fied beliefs depend – from those that are not justification-affording, in a way that ex-
plains the relevant connection between justification and truth.24 
 
Second, there is the problem of reasoning. Indeed, PEM deals basically with un-
conscious Bayesian inference, while infinitists, as we have seen, normally require 
reasoning, i.e. human conscious reasoning, for something to be qualified as genuine 
knowledge. 
To sum up, in order to strengthen Hohwy’s interpretation of PEM it seems urgent 
to address the following issues: 1) giving an account of the hypotheses formation 
process; 2) adopting a conception of knowledge more suited to PEM’s ‘scientific 
antirealism’; 3) elaborating an anti-skeptical position which is able to avoid the diffi-
culties afflicting infinitism. In the next section, we will suggest that in order to ad-
dress those issues it could be fruitful to take into consideration Carlo Cellucci’s work. 
6 The Heuristic View 
For reasons of space, it is not possible here to give an exhaustive exposition of the 
Heuristic View (HV) developed by Carlo Cellucci (2015; 2014; 2013). In what fol-
lows, we will illustrate just the core tenets of Cellucci’s position. 
6.1 The Analytic Method as a Model of Hypothesis Production 
According to HV, the method of philosophy, mathematics, and the natural sciences is 
the very same method, and it is the analytic method. The analytic method, which goes 
back to Hippocrates of Chios, Hippocrates of Cos, and Plato, may be described as 
follows: 
 
                                                          
24 Cling 2004, p. 110. 
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to solve a problem, one looks for some hypothesis that is a sufficient condition for solv-
ing it. The hypothesis is obtained from the problem, and possibly other data already 
available, by some non-deductive rule, and must be plausible […]. But the hypothesis is 
in its turn a problem that must be solved, and is solved in the same way […]. And so on, 
ad infinitum.25 
 
According to HV, the axiomatic method is inadequate for giving a naturalistic ac-
count of how knowledge is pursued. Indeed, the axiomatic method is not able to ac-
count for the hypotheses production process, and so it is not able to show the real path 
that has been followed to reach a given result. On the contrary, the analytic method is 
the method used in the process of discovery. Indeed, since in order to solve a problem 
hypotheses are produced by non-deductive inferences, logic is essentially a logic of 
discovery.
26
 
6.2 The Heuristic View and Knowledge 
According to HV, the analytic method provides a model of knowledge ampliation. 
But how knowledge has to be conceived according to this perspective? If the method 
of philosophy, mathematics and the natural sciences is the analytic method, and the 
analytic method is essentially characterized by the use of ampliative inferences, i.e. 
inferences that are not truth-preserving,
27
 the problem arises of how to conceive the 
relation between knowledge produced by means of the analytic method and truth. 
Indeed, usually scientific realists take the aim of science to be the truth. For example, 
Sankey states that “the aim of science is to discover the truth about the world” 
(Sankey 2004, p. 215). Contrary to this view, according to Cellucci the concept of 
truth has to be replaced with the concept of plausibility.
28
 Indeed, since the traditional 
definitions of truth are not able to give us a criterion of truth, i.e. a non-algorithmic 
means to decide whether a statement is true, they cannot avoid the skeptical argument 
of the criterion (Cellucci 2014).
29
 For example, Cellucci states that the concept of 
truth as correspondence is not adequate as a criterion of truth because, as Kant states: 
 
                                                          
25 Cellucci 2013, p. 55. 
26 The analytic method has not to be confused with the analytic-synthetic method. According 
to the analytic-synthetic method as stated by Aristotle, the search for a solution to a problem is 
a finite process, and once the prime premises have been found, “the only role which remains for 
analysis is to find deductions of given conclusions from prime premises” (Cellucci 2013, p. 75). 
On the contrary, in the analytic method there is no given prime premise, the path to find hy-
potheses is only ‘ascending’, and it has not to terminate. 
27 Hintikka and Sandu 2007, p. 13. 
28 For a plausibility test procedure, cf. Cellucci 2013, p. 56: “(1) Deduce conclusions from the 
hypothesis. (2) Compare the conclusions with each other, in order to see that the hypothesis 
does not lead to contradictions. (3) Compare the conclusions with other hypotheses already 
known to be plausible, and with results of observations or experiments, in order to see that the 
arguments for the hypothesis are stronger than those against it on the basis of experience.” 
29 On the problem of the criterion of truth cf. e.g. Sextus Empiricus 1976, II.2. 
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according to the correspondence conception, truth “consists in the agreement of cognition 
with its object,” but “I can compare the object with my cognition” only “by cognizing it” 
(Kant 1992, 557). Then, “since the object is outside me, the cognition in me, all I can ev-
er pass judgment on is whether my cognition of the object agrees” not with the object but 
only “with my cognition of the object” (557–58). Therefore, we cannot know whether a 
theory about the world is true in the [...] correspondence sense. This makes truth some-
thing that humans cannot reach, and makes the aim of science ultimately unachievable.30 
 
Being truth such an unrealistic aim, Cellucci takes instead plausibility as the cen-
tral concept of epistemology: 
 
the goal of science is plausibility. Scientific theories do not deal with the essence of natu-
ral substances, but only with some of their phenomenal properties, and deal with them on 
the basis of plausible hypotheses. Then a scientific theory is not a set of truths but rather 
a set of plausible hypotheses. Thus the goal of science is plausibility rather than truth.31 
 
Thus, according to HV what we really do, and can do, is producing hypotheses by 
means of some non-deductive rule, and then assessing the arguments for and the ar-
guments against any hypothesis and provisionally accept or refute such hypothesis.
32
 
6.3 The Analytic Method as an Anti-Skeptical Option 
Let’s now compare HV with infinitism. HV may as well as infinitism be considered 
an anti-skeptical option, since it claims not only that we do have knowledge, but also 
that knowledge is necessary to survive. Moreover, HV and infinitism have in common 
the idea that the fact that knowledge acquisition may be a potential infinite process 
does not prevent us to consider genuine knowledge that portion of knowledge we 
reached so far. For example, Cellucci states that: 
 
Even if, by the finiteness of human capacities, we cannot go through an infinite series, 
this does not mean that the series of the premises cannot be infinite but only that, at each 
stage, we can only go through a finite initial segment of the series. And yet we can go 
through longer and longer finite initial segments.33 
 
But HV and infinitism are nevertheless distinct positions. Indeed, infinitism retains 
the relation between knowledge and truth, and thus has to face the difficulty outlined 
above (sec. 6.2). As we have seen, infinitism per se is not really able to face the skep-
tical challenge and connect justification to truth. On the contrary, HV can safely 
maintain that knowledge acquisition is a potentially infinite process and that the 
                                                          
30 Cellucci 2015, pp. 217-218. 
31 Cellucci 2013, p. 154. 
32 This view is related to Aristotle’s definition of endoxa, see Cellucci 2013, Sect. 5.7. 
33 Cellucci unpublished, Sect. 3.2. 
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knowledge produced so far is genuine knowledge, since HV conceives knowledge as 
plausible and provisional, and does not relate it to truth: 
 
if the series of the premises is infinite, there will be no immediately justified premises, so 
no knowledge will be definitive, all knowledge will always be in need of further consid-
eration. But this does not mean that there can be no knowledge. There could be no 
knowledge only if the premises, or hypotheses, occurring in the infinite series were arbi-
trary. But they are not arbitrary since [...] they must be plausible, that is, such that the ar-
guments for them must be stronger than those against them [...].34, 35 
 
HV and infinitism diverge also with regard to the ‘reasoning requirement’ made by 
the infinitists to consider something as genuine knowledge. Indeed, Cellucci sees the 
production of knowledge essentially as a problem solving process, which is homoge-
neous throughout the biological realm. The way in which problems are solved is simi-
lar among all organisms, because “knowledge has a biological role, just like other 
capacities which ensure the survival of organisms [...] knowledge is essential for life” 
(Cellucci 2013, p. 250). Moreover, according to HV even unconscious inferences 
contribute to knowledge: “in the analytic method, some non-deductive inferences by 
which hypotheses are obtained may be unconscious” (Ibidem, p. 235). Thus, HV does 
not require reasoning in order to consider something as genuine knowledge. 
7 Conclusion. The Heuristic View and PEM 
From the exposition of Cellucci’s proposal, it appears that HV could considerably 
strengthen Hohwy’s position. Indeed, HV seems able to provide to those who follow 
Hohwy’s interpretation of PEM: 1) a theoretical account of hypotheses formation, 2) a 
conception of knowledge decoupled from the concept of truth, and 3) an anti-skeptical 
position which is able to avoid the difficulties that afflict infinitism, but which at the 
same time displays those features that made us judge infinitism to be the position 
more compatible with PEM. Combining Cellucci’s view with Hohwy’s interpretation 
of PEM seems then to be a fruitful perspective worth of further investigations. 
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